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1. Introduction
Among the many contributions of John McCarthy, the formalism of the situation calculus has proved to be an extremely
useful tool for reasoning precisely about action and change. It was originally proposed in [29,30] as a dialect of ﬁrst-order
logic. A second-order reﬁnement of the language, developed by Reiter and his colleagues [36], forms the theoretical and
implementation foundation for Golog [27], a language for the high-level control of robots and other agents (see, for example,
[2,31]). Over the past decade, a number of extensions have been proposed to deal with issues such as time, natural actions,
knowledge of agents, numerical uncertainty, or utilities (see [36] and the references therein).
As a formalism, the situation calculus is based on axioms. In Reiter’s formulation, which is also our starting point, these
take the form of so-called basic action theories. These consist of a number of foundational axioms, which deﬁne the space of
situations, unique-name axioms for actions, axioms describing action preconditions and effects, and axioms about the initial
situation.
What makes basic action theories particularly useful is the formulation of action effects in terms of successor state axioms,
which not only provide a simple solution to the frame problem [35] but also allow the use of regression-based reasoning,
which has been used in planning [8] and forms the core of every Golog interpreter, for example. Derivations using regression
are simple, clear, and computationally feasible.
Since the situation calculus is deﬁned axiomatically, no special semantics is needed. Tarskian models suﬃce, provided
they satisfy the foundational axioms. When the focus is on logical entailments, which is the case in the execution of Golog
programs, for example, this approach seems perfectly adequate.
However, when we wish to consider theoretical questions about basic action theories that are not direct entailment
questions, problems arise. For example, suppose we are doing an analysis of our system, and want to know, if whenever
Theory1 entails Formula1, is it also true that Theory2 entails Formula2? Here we can run into serious complications in an
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axiomatic setting unless there are ways to take derivations of Formula1 from Theory1 and convert them into derivations of
Formula2 from Theory2. Similar issues arise with consistency questions.
For instance, consider the epistemic extension of the situation calculus, as introduced by Moore and later extended by
Scherl and Levesque [32,39]. If Know(A) entails (Know(B) ∨ Know(C)) in this theory, is it also true that Know(A) entails
Know(B) or Know(A) entails Know(C)? For restricted A, B , C , the answer is yes, but the proof by Reiter requires a multi-
page argument using considerable proof–theoretic machinery, including Craig’s Interpolation Lemma [37].
One might wonder whether a semantic proof using Tarski structures would be any easier. The answer, in short, is no. The
problem is that different Tarski structures can have different domains and considerable effort is required to standardize the
domains, identify the situations, and amalgamate multiple structures into a single structure that satisﬁes the foundational
axioms. While certainly possible, the argument is again long and complicated.
In contrast, in the epistemic logic KL [22], the semantic proof of the above determinacy of knowledge theorem is simple,
clear and direct. One reason for this is the use of a semantic formulation involving possible worlds for knowledge [12,7].
Typical of these formalisms, situations and possible worlds are not reiﬁed in the language itself. Beyond this, however,
a major factor in the simplicity of proofs in KL (and its extension, OL) is the use of standard names, which allows a substi-
tutional interpretation of the ﬁrst-order quantiﬁers.1 While there have been philosophical arguments against substitutional
quantiﬁcation [18], our experience has been that its technical simplicity has been of tremendous help in tackling issues
such as quantifying-in [15], which are rarely addressed in other formalisms.
Since KL only deals with static knowledge bases, an amalgamation of KL and the situation calculus was previously pro-
posed [19]. However, this formalization kept situations reiﬁed, did not allow substitutional quantiﬁcation, and the deﬁnition
of knowledge required second-order logic, all of which again complicated the proofs considerably, even semantic ones.
In this paper, we propose a rather different amalgamation of KL and the situation calculus called ES . The idea is to
keep the simplicity of KL, and while dropping some of the expressiveness of the ordinary situation calculus, retain its main
beneﬁts, like successor state axioms to solve the frame problem and regression-based reasoning. In particular, we will use a
possible-world semantics where situations are part of the semantics but do not appear as terms in the language. In order to
represent what is true in a situation after a number of actions have occurred, we use special modal operators. For example,
we will have formulas like those of traditional dynamic logic [33,10], such as
[forward] [forward]distance = 4
to say that a robot is four units away from a wall after moving forward twice (see Fig. 1 for an illustration). In contrast
to other modal approaches such as [3,11,5] but similar to [6], we also allow formulas of the form ∀a, x.([a](distance = x) ≡
φ), where modalities contain (action) variables. This feature will be key in reconstructing Reiter’s basic action theories in
our language. Moreover, unlike standard modal logics (including dynamic logics), we will be able to use a substitutional
interpretation for ﬁrst-order quantiﬁers. This is perhaps the main reason why we cannot afford situation terms as part of
our language. The epistemic situation calculus requires us to consider an uncountable number of initial situations (see [26]
for a second-order foundational axiom that makes this explicit). In a language with only countably many situation terms,
this would preclude a substitutional interpretation of quantiﬁers.
Yielding much simpler proofs (like the determinacy of knowledge and the correctness of regression) still leaves open the
question of the overall correctness of the approach. In other words, is ES really a faithful reconstruction of the situation
calculus? We will prove that it is by providing an embedding of ES in Reiter’s version of the situation calculus, showing
that the valid sentences of ES can be cast as entailments in Reiter’s original version (modulo some modest assumptions).
This shows that ES is a notational variant for a fragment of the situation calculus that can be given a clean and work-
able semantics. In addition, this result allows us to automatically transfer results obtained for ES to that fragment of the
situation calculus, which is expressive enough to formulate basic action theories, and more.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the syntax and semantics of ES and
discuss some of the properties of knowledge. In Section 3, we introduce the ES-version of Reiter’s basic action theories,
1 Roughly speaking, this amounts to assuming at the outset that the domain of quantiﬁcation is countably inﬁnite and that there is a set of special
constants called standard names uniquely denoting each element of the domain. A ﬁrst-order universal sentence then ends up being true iff every instance
of the sentence, where a standard name substitutes for the variable, is true.
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in the situation calculus. We end the paper with a discussion of related work, only-knowing, and concluding remarks.
2. The logic ES
The language is a second-order modal dialect with equality and sorts of type object and action. Before presenting the
formal details, here are the main features:
• Standard names: Unlike other languages (but similar to KL), the language includes (countably many) standard names for
both objects and actions. These can be thought of as special extra constants that satisfy the unique name assumption
and an inﬁnitary version of domain closure. This allows ﬁrst-order quantiﬁcation to be understood substitutionally.
Equality can also be given a simpler treatment: every ground term will have a coreferring standard name, and two
terms are considered equal if their coreferring standard names are identical.
• Fluent and rigid functions and predicates: The language also contains both ﬂuent and rigid predicate and function symbols.
Fluents vary as the result of actions and have values that may be unknown, but rigids do not. These are present in the
original situation calculus, of course. For example, we might have a sentence like this in the situation calculus:
Fragile(c) ∧ ¬Broken(c, S0).
Here we can see that the ﬁrst predicate is rigid and the second one is ﬂuent just by seeing if the last argument is a
situation. In our case, we do not have situation terms, and so we will need to distinguish the two sorts of predicates
syntactically and semantically. Furthermore, for second-order quantiﬁcation, we will need to distinguish rigid and ﬂuent
predicate variables as well.2
• Knowledge and truth: The language includes a modal operator Know for knowledge. This allows us to distinguish between
sentences that are true and sentences that are known (by some implicit agent). For example, we can model situations
where a robot is close to a wall but does not yet know it. We can also model situations where a robot has false beliefs
about its world or how its world changes. The connection between knowledge and truth is made with sensing. Every
action is assumed to have a binary sensing result and after performing the action, the agent learns that the action was
possible (as indicated by the Poss predicate) and whether the sensing result for the action was 1 or 0 (as indicated by
the SF predicate).
2.1. The language
Deﬁnition 1. The symbols of ES are taken from the following vocabulary:
• ﬁrst-order variables: x1, x2, . . . , y1, y2, . . . ,a1,a2, . . . ;
• ﬂuent second-order variables of arity k: Pk1, Pk2, . . . ;
• rigid second-order variables of arity k: Q k1, Q k2, . . . ;• standard names: n1,n2, . . . for objects and actions;
• ﬂuent function symbols of arity k: f k1 , f k2 , . . . ; for example, distance;
• rigid function symbols of arity k: gk1, gk2, . . . ; for example, forward;
• ﬂuent predicate symbols of arity k: Fk1, Fk2, . . . ; for example, Broken;
• rigid predicate symbols of arity k: Gk1,Gk2, . . . ; for example, BrotherOf ;• connectives and other symbols: =, ∧, ¬, ∀, Know, , round and square parentheses, period, comma.
We assume that all action function symbols are rigid and that the ﬂuent predicates include the special predicates Poss
and SF .
Deﬁnition 2. The terms of the language are of sort action or object, and form the least set of expressions such that
1. Every standard name and ﬁrst-order variable is a term of the corresponding sort;
2. If t1, . . . , tk are terms and h is a k-ary function symbol then h(t1, . . . , tk) is a term of the same sort as h.
By a primitive term we mean one of the form h(n1, . . . ,nk) where h is a (ﬂuent or rigid) function symbol and all of the
ni are standard names.
2 We follow Reiter in including both types of symbols. It is possible to live with just ﬂuents, however, and treat rigids as ﬂuents that happen not to
change.
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1. If t1, . . . , tk are terms, and H is a k-ary predicate symbol then H(t1, . . . , tk) is an (atomic) formula;
2. If t1, . . . , tk are terms, and V is a k-ary second-order variable, then V (t1, . . . , tk) is an (atomic) formula;
3. If t1 and t2 are terms, then (t1 = t2) is a formula;
4. If t is an action term and α is a formula, then [t]α is a formula;
5. If α and β are formulas, v is a ﬁrst-order variable, and V is a second-order variable, then the following are also
formulas: (α ∧ β), ¬α, ∀v.α, ∀V .α, α, Know(α).
We read [t]α as “α holds after action t”, and α as “α holds after any sequence of actions.” So, for example, here is a
successor state axiom in this language (we follow the usual convention of having free variables universally quantiﬁed from
the outside):
([a]Broken(x) ≡
(
a = drop(x) ∧ Fragile(x)) ∨
(
Broken(x) ∧ a = repair(x)))
In English: after any sequence of actions, an object x will be broken after doing action a iff a is the dropping of x when
x is fragile or x was already broken and a is not the action of repairing it.
As usual, we treat (α ∨ β), (α ⊃ β), (α ≡ β), ∃v.α, and ∃V .α as abbreviations. To ease notation, we leave the type of
variables implicit. We reserve the symbol a to denote a variable of type action.
We use αxn to mean formula α with all free occurrences of variable x replaced by name n. We call a formula without
free variables a sentence. By a primitive sentence we mean a formula of the form H(n1, . . . ,nk) where H is a (ﬂuent or rigid)
predicate symbol and all of the ni are standard names.
In the following, we will sometimes refer to special sorts of ﬁrst-order formulas and use the following terminology:
• a formula with no  operators is called bounded;
• a formula with no  or [t] operators is called static;
• a formula with no Know operators is called objective;
• a formula with no ﬂuent, , or [t] operators outside the scope of a Know is called subjective;
• a formula with no Know, , [t], Poss, or SF is called a ﬂuent formula.3
2.2. The semantics
The main purpose of the semantics we are about to present is to be precise about how we handle ﬂuents, which may
vary as the result of actions and whose values may be unknown. Intuitively, to determine whether or not a sentence α
is true after a sequence of actions z has been performed, we need to specify two things: a world w and an epistemic
state e. We write e,w, z |
 α. A world determines truth values for the primitive sentences and coreferring standard names
for the primitive terms after any sequence of actions. An epistemic state is deﬁned by a set of worlds, as in possible-world
semantics.
More precisely, let N denote the set of all standard names and Z the set of all ﬁnite sequences of standard action
names, including 〈 〉, the empty sequence. Then
• a world w ∈ W is any function from the primitive sentences and Z to {0,1}, and from the primitive terms and Z to N
(preserving sorts), and satisfying the rigidity constraint: if g is a rigid function or predicate symbol, then for all z and
z′ in Z , w[g(n1, . . . ,nk), z] = w[g(n1, . . . ,nk), z′];
• an epistemic state e ⊆ W is any set of worlds.
We extend the idea of coreferring standard names to arbitrary ground terms as follows. Given a term t without variables,
a world w , and an action sequence z, we deﬁne |t|zw (read: the coreferring standard name for t given w and z) by:
1. If t ∈ N , then |t|zw = t;
2. |h(t1, . . . , tk)|zw = w[h(n1, . . . ,nk), z], where ni = |ti |zw .
So to ﬁnd a coreferring standard name for h(t1, . . . , tk), we ﬁnd coreferring names for the ti recursively, and then use
the function w on the resulting primitive term.
3 In the situation calculus, these correspond to formulas that are uniform in some situation term.
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the standard names. To handle the quantiﬁcation over second-order variables, we use second-order variable maps deﬁned as
follows:
The second-order primitives are formulas of the form V (n1, . . . ,nk) where V is a (ﬂuent or rigid) second-order variable
and all of the ni are standard names. A variable map u is a function from worlds, second-order primitives, and Z to
{0,1}, satisfying the rigidity constraint: if Q is a rigid second-order variable, then for all w and w ′ in W , and all z and
z′ in Z , u[w, Q (n1, . . . ,nk), z] = u[w ′, Q (n1, . . . ,nk), z′].
Let u and u′ be variable maps, and let V be a (ﬂuent or rigid) second-order variable; we write u′ ∼V u to mean that u
and u′ agree except perhaps on the second-order primitives involving V .
Finally, to interpret what is known after a sequence of actions has taken place, we deﬁne w ′ z w (read: w ′ agrees with
w agree on the sensing throughout action sequence z) inductively by the following:
1. w ′ 〈 〉 w iff w ′ and w agree on the value of every primitive rigid term and sentence;
2. w ′ z·n w iff w ′ z w , w ′[Poss(n), z] = 1, and
w ′
[
SF(n), z
] = w[SF(n), z].
Note that z is not quite an equivalence relation because of the use of Poss here. As will become clearer, this is because
we are insisting that the agent comes to believe that Poss was true after performing an action, even in those “non-legal”
situations where the action was not possible in reality.4
Putting all these together, here is the semantic deﬁnition of truth. Given a sentence α of ES , an epistemic state e ⊆ W
and a world w ∈ W , we deﬁne e,w |
 α (read: α is true at e and w) as e,w, 〈 〉,u |
 α for any second-order variable map u,
where for any z ∈ Z we have:
1. e,w, z,u |
 H(t1, . . . , tk) iff w[H(n1, . . . ,nk), z] = 1, where ni = |ti|zw ;
2. e,w, z,u |
 V (t1, . . . , tk) iff u[w, V (n1, . . . ,nk), z] = 1, where ni = |ti|zw ;
3. e,w, z,u |
 (t1 = t2) iff n1 and n2 are identical, where ni = |ti |zw ;
4. e,w, z,u |
 [t]α iff e,w, z · n,u |
 α, where n = |t|zw ;
5. e,w, z,u |
 (α ∧ β) iff e,w, z,u |
 α and e,w, z,u |
 β;
6. e,w, z,u |
 ¬α iff e,w, z,u |
 α;
7. e,w, z,u |
 ∀x.α iff e,w, z,u |
 αxn, for every standard name n of the right sort;
8. e,w, z,u |
 ∀V .α iff e,w, z,u′ |
 α, for every u′ ∼V u;
9. e,w, z,u |
α iff e,w, z · z′,u |
 α, for every z′ ∈ Z;
10. e,w, z,u |
 Know(α) iff e,w ′, z,u |
 α, for every w ′ ∈ e such that w ′ z w .
When α is objective (has no Know operators), we can leave out the e and write w |
 α. Similarly, when α is subjective,
we can leave out the w and write e |
 α. When Σ is a set of sentences and α is a sentence, we write Σ |
 α (read:
Σ logically entails α) to mean that for every e and w , if e,w |
 α′ for every α′ ∈ Σ , then e,w |
 α. Finally, we write |
 α
(read: α is valid) to mean {} |
 α.
2.3. Knowledge
At this point we will not go into a detailed discussion of the properties of ES . Instead we will focus on knowledge as a
ﬁrst example of how the semantics of ES allows us to prove properties with relative ease. A more complete picture of ES
will emerge later when we establish a formal connection with Reiter’s situation calculus.
The interpretation of knowledge in ES is just a special case of possible-world semantics [17,12]. One minor feature
worth noting is that we do not simply require truth in all elements of e, the given set of “possible worlds,” as in KL. In
fact, e represents the initial state of knowledge, and as knowledge is acquired though action, some of those initial worlds
will no longer be considered possible. This is reﬂected in the z relation. In a nutshell, we look for truth in all elements of
e that agree with the real world w in terms of sensing. It will then follow that after doing a sequence of actions, the agent
will know the correct values of the sensing results in the real world (and everything it can conclude from that).
Regarding the more traditional logical properties of knowledge, it is not surprising that we obtain the usual properties
of weak S5 or K45 [7]. Since we assume a ﬁxed universe of discourse, the Barcan formula for knowledge (Property 4 of the
following theorem) and its existential version (Property 5) hold as well. Moreover, these properties hold after any number
of actions have been performed.
4 An alternate account that would state that the agent learns the true value of Poss (analogous to SF) is a bit more cumbersome, but would allow z to
be a full equivalence relation.
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1. |
(Know(α) ∧ Know(α ⊃ β) ⊃ Know(β));
2. |
(Know(α) ⊃ Know(Know(α)));
3. |
(¬Know(α) ⊃ Know(¬Know(α)));
4. |
(∀x.Know(α) ⊃ Know(∀x.α));
5. |
(∃x.Know(α) ⊃ Know(∃x.α)).
Proof.
1. Let e,w, z |
 Know(α) ∧ Know(α ⊃ β). Then for all w ′ z w , if w ′ ∈ e then e,w ′, z |
 α and e,w ′, z |
 (α ⊃ β). Hence,
e,w ′, z |
 β and, therefore, we have that e,w, z |
 Know(β).
2. Let e,w, z |
 Know(α). Let w ′ and w ′′ be worlds in e such that w ′ z w and w ′′ z w ′ . Since z is an equivalence
relation, we have w ′′ z w and, therefore, e,w ′′, z |
 α by assumption. As this is true for all w ′′ ∈ e with w ′′ z w ′ , we
have e,w ′, z |
 Know(α) and, hence, e,w, z |
 Know(Know(α)).
3. Let e,w, z |
 ¬Know(α). Thus for some w ′ , w ′ z w , w ′ ∈ e and e,w ′, z |
 α. Let w ′′ be any world such that w ′′ z w ′
and w ′′ ∈ e. Clearly, e,w ′′, z |
 ¬Know(α). Since w ′′ z w , e,w, z |
 Know(¬Know(α)) follows.
4. Let e,w, z |
 ∀x.Know(α). Hence for all r ∈ R , e,w, z |
 Know(αxr ) and thus for all w ′ z w , if w ′ ∈ e then for all n ∈ N
of the right sort, e,w, z |
 αxn , from which e,w, z |
 Know(∀x.α) follows.
5. Let e,w, z |
 ∃x.Know(α). Then e,w, z |
 Know(αxn) for some n ∈ N . By the deﬁnition of Know, it follows that e,w, z |

Know(∃x.α). 
We remark that the converse of the Barcan formula (Property 4) holds as well. However, note that this is not the case
for Property 5: (Know(∃x.α) ⊃ ∃x.Know(α)) is not valid in general. Despite the fact that quantiﬁcation is understood
substitutionally, knowing that someone satisﬁes α does not entail knowing who that individual is, just as it should be.
Perhaps more interestingly, we can easily prove a generalized version of the determinacy of knowledge:
Theorem 2. Suppose α is an objective sentence and β is an objective formula with one free variable x, such that |
 Know(α) ⊃
∃x.Know(β). Then for some standard name n, |
 Know(α) ⊃ Know(βxn).
Proof. Suppose not. Then for every n (of the right sort), Know(α) does not entail Know(βxn), and so, by the lemma below,
α does not entail βxn . So for every n, there is a world wn such that wn |
 (α ∧ ¬βxn). Now let e = {wn | n a standard name}.
Then we have that e |
 Know(α) and for every standard name n, e |
 ¬Know(βxn), and so e |
 ∀x.¬Know(β). This contradicts
the fact that Know(α) entails ∃x.Know(β). 
Lemma 1. If α and β are objective, and |
 (α ⊃ β), then |
 (Know(α) ⊃ Know(β)).
Proof. Suppose that some e |
 Know(α). Then for every w ∈ e,w |
 α. Then for every w ∈ e,w |
 β . Thus e |
 Know(β). 
This proof is exactly as it would be in KL. Again it is worth noting that the proof of this theorem in the ordinary
situation calculus (for the simpler case involving disjunction rather than existential quantiﬁcation) is a multi-page argument
involving Craig’s Interpolation Lemma.
3. Basic action theories
Let us now consider the equivalent of basic action theories of the situation calculus. Since in our logic there is no explicit
notion of situations our basic action theories do not require foundational axioms like Reiter’s second-order induction axiom
for situations [36]. In fact, for this and the next section we will have no use for second-order logic at all and only consider
the ﬁrst-order fragment of ES .
Deﬁnition 4. Given a set of ﬂuents F , a set Σ ⊆ ES of sentences is called a basic action theory over F iff Σ = Σuna ∪ Σ0 ∪
Σpre ∪ Σpost ∪ Σsense where Σ mentions only ﬂuents in F and
1. Σuna is a set of unique names axioms for action functions;
2. Σ0 is any set of ﬂuent sentences;
3. Σpre is a singleton sentence of the form Poss(a) ≡ π , where π is a ﬂuent formula5;
5 We assume that  has lower syntactic precedence than the logical connectives, so that Poss(a) ≡ π stands for ∀a.(Poss(a) ≡ π ).
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functional ﬂuent f , respectively, and where γF and γ f are ﬂuent formulas6;
5. Σsense is a sentence exactly parallel to the one for Poss of the form SF(a) ≡ ϕ , where ϕ is a ﬂuent formula.
The idea here is that Σ0 expresses what is true initially (in the initial situation), Σpre is one large precondition axiom,
and Σpost is a set of successor state axioms, one per ﬂuent, which incorporate the solution to the frame problem proposed
by Reiter [35]. Here we follow the convention of [39] that every action returns a sensing result. Σsense then captures the
outcome of sensing actions. For actions like forward, which do not return any useful sensing information, SF can be deﬁned
to be vacuously true (see below for an example).7
Since an agent’s beliefs may differ from what is true, we will, in general, need two basic action theories: Σ for what
is true in the world, including its dynamics, and Σ ′ for what the agent believes to be true. Except for the unique names
assumption for actions, the two are allowed to differ arbitrarily and even contradict each other to allow for false beliefs.
A state of affairs can then be characterized by sentences of the form Σ to denote what is actually true, Know(Σ ′) to denote
what the agent believes to be true, and perhaps a set of sentences ¬Know(φ) to capture some of the agent’s ignorance.8
We will be interested in the what is entailed by such theories.
As an example, imagine a robot that lives in a 1-dimensional world, and that can move towards or away from a ﬁxed
wall. The robot also has a sonar sensor that tells it when it gets close to the wall, say, less than 10 units away. See Fig. 1.
So we might imagine three actions, forward and backward which move the robot one unit towards and away from the wall,
and a sonar sensing action which tells the robot if it is close to the wall but has no effect on the world. For simplicity,
we will simply assume that these three are standard names, that is, we do not need to stipulate unique names axioms for
these. We have a single ﬂuent, distance, which gives the actual distance from the robot to the wall.9
Let us consider informally how sensing relates knowledge to truth here. We start in some initial epistemic state e and
world w . Initially, before any actions have taken place, the action sequence z is 〈 〉. We might suppose that w[distance, 〈 〉] =
6 as in the diagram. If the robot does not know where it is, there may be a w∗ ∈ e where w∗[distance, 〈 〉] = 13. Now suppose
the robot performs a sonar action. In this case, we would expect that w[SF(sonar), 〈 〉] = 1, but w∗[SF(sonar), 〈 〉] = 0. In
other words, if the sonar is doing its job, in w it would tell us that the robot is close to the wall and in w∗ it would tell
us that the robot is far from the wall. So if we now let z = 〈sonar〉, we see that w∗ z w , since they disagree on the SF
value. In fact, for every w ′ such that w ′ z w , we will have that w ′[SF(sonar), 〈 〉] = 1. Since the deﬁnition of Know uses ,
when we consider what is known after doing the sonar action, the robot will believe (correctly) that it is close to the wall:
e,w, 〈sonar〉 |
 Know(distance < 10).
Let us now make all this precise. We begin our formalization by writing preconditions for the three actions:
Poss(a) ≡
a = forward∧ distance > 0 ∨
a = backward∧ TRUE ∨
a = sonar ∧ TRUE.
In other words, while backward and sonar are always possible, forward is executable only when the robot is not already at
the wall. Next, we deﬁne the sensing results for the actions:
SF(a) ≡
a = forward∧ TRUE ∨
a = backward∧ TRUE ∨
a = sonar ∧ distance < 10.
Since backward and forward are not expected to return any useful sensing information, SF is vacuously true for them, while
SF(sonar) says that the sonar returns 1 precisely when the distance to the wall is less than 10. Finally, we write a successor
state axiom for our only ﬂuent:
[a](distance = x) ≡
a = forward∧ distance = x+ 1 ∨
6 The [t] construct has higher precedence than the logical connectives. So [a]F (x) ≡ γF abbreviates ∀a.([a]F (x). ≡ γF ).
7 In this paper we restrict ourselves to sensing truth values. See [39] for how to handle arbitrary values.
8 When we use Σ as part of a sentence we mean the conjunction of all the ﬁnitely many sentences contained in Σ .
9 Here and below, we use simple arithmetic involving <, +, and −, which can easily be deﬁned in second-order terms with the standard names acting
as natural numbers. We omit the details.
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a = forward∧ a = backward∧ distance = x.
In other words, the distance to the wall increases or decreases by 1 depending on whether backward or forward is executed,
or it remains as before for all other actions.
Now we are ready to consider some speciﬁcs having to do with what is true initially by deﬁning an action theory. Let
Close stand for the formula “distance < 10.” Let φ denote the conjunction of the sentences above. We assume that φ is true
and the robot knows it. We also assume the robot is located initially 6 units away from the wall, but that the robot has no
idea where it is. So, we let Σ = {φ} ∪ {distance= 6} and Σ ′ = {φ}. Then we get this:
Example 1. The following are logical entailments of
Σ ∧ Know(Σ ′) ∧ ∀x.¬Know(distance = x):
1. Close∧ ¬Know(Close) ∧ [forward]¬Know(Close)
the robot is close to the wall, but does not know it, and continues not to know it after moving forward;
2. [sonar](Know(Close) ∧ [forward]Know(Close))
after reading the sonar, the robot knows it is close, and continues to know it after moving forward;
3. [sonar][backward]¬Know(Close)
after reading the sonar and then moving backward, the robot no longer knows that it is close to the wall;
4. [backward][sonar]Know(Close)
after moving backward and then reading the sonar, the robot knows that it is close to the wall;
5. [sonar][forward][backward]Know(Close)
after reading the sonar, moving forward, and then backward, the robot knows that it is still close to the wall;
6. [sonar]Know([forward]Close)
after reading the sonar, the robot knows that it will remain close after moving forward;
7. ¬Know([sonar]Know(Close))
the robot does not know initially that it will know that it is close after reading the sonar;
8. Know([sonar](Know(Close) ∨ Know(¬Close)))
the robot does know initially that after reading the sonar, it will then know whether or not it is close to the wall;
9. Know([sonar][backward]¬Know(Close))
the robot knows initially that it will not know that it is close after reading the sonar and moving backwards.
Proof. The proofs of these are similar. Here we will only do item 3. Let z = 〈sonar · backward〉, and suppose that e,w |

Σ ∧ Know(Σ ′)∧∀x.¬Know(distance = x); we must show that e,w, z |
 ¬Know(Close). Because e |
 ∀x.¬Know(distance = x),
there exists w ′ ∈ e such that w ′ 〈 〉 w and w ′[distance, 〈 〉] = 9. Since 9 < 10, we also have that w ′ z w . However,
w ′[distance, z] = 10. So there exists w ′ ∈ e such that w ′ z w and w ′, z |
 ¬Close. Therefore, e,w, z |
 ¬Know(Close). 
4. Projection by regression
The examples of the previous section all involve projection as a fundamental reasoning task, that is, determining what
holds after a number of actions have occurred, as in
Σ ∧ Know(Σ ′) ∧ ∀x.¬Know(distance = x) |
 [sonar][backward]¬Know(Close).
When we are not concerned with knowledge, things are somewhat simpler as we only need a single basic action theory as
in
Σ |
 [forward][backward]Close.
For this simpler case, Reiter [36] showed how successor state axioms allow the use of regression to solve this reasoning task
for certain α (which he called the regressable formulas) and which, roughly, correspond to bounded objective formulas in ES .
The idea is to successively replace ﬂuents in α by the right-hand side of their successor state axioms until the resulting
sentence contains no more actions, at which point one need only check whether that sentence follows from the sentences
in the initial theory. Later Scherl and Levesque [39] extended these results to handle knowledge in the situation calculus. In
this section we will show how these ideas carry over to ES , beginning with the non-epistemic fragment of the language.
4.1. Regressing objective formulas
Here we consider regression to determine entailments of the form Σ |
 α, where Σ is a basic action theory and α
is any bounded objective sentence. To start with we assume, from now on, that all basic action theories and queries are
rectiﬁed, that is, that each quantiﬁer has a distinct variable. This is needed for regression to work properly and later for the
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the following normal form NF .
Deﬁnition 5. A sentence α is in NF if it is rectiﬁed and every function symbol f in α occurs only in equality expressions of
the form ( f (n1, . . . ,nk) = n), where the ni and n here are either variables or standard names.
It is easy to show that every sentence can be transformed into an equivalent one in NF and the transformation is linear
in the size of the original sentence. For example, if b is a rigid constant and f a functional ﬂuent, then the normal form of
F ( f (b)) is ∃x, y.(b = x) ∧ ( f (x) = y) ∧ F (y). Note that, for any formula in NF , if a term t appears in [t] or as an argument
to a function or predicate, then t is either a variable or a standard name. In the following we will make use of sequences
which consist of action variables or action standard names. We will reserve the symbol r to denote such sequences. (We
continue to use z to denote the special case where all elements of the sequence are standard names.)
In our account, any bounded, objective sentence α in NF is considered regressable. By the transformation above any
bounded, objective sentence becomes regressable by ﬁrst converting it into NF and then applying regression to the result.
Deﬁnition 6. We deﬁne R[α], the regression of α wrt Σ , to be R[〈 〉,α], where for any sequence r consisting of action
variables or standard names, R[r,α] is deﬁned inductively on α by:
1. R[r,∀xα] = ∀xR[r,α];
2. R[r, (α ∧ β)] = (R[r,α] ∧ R[r, β]);
3. R[r,¬α] = ¬R[r,α];
4. R[r, [t]α] = R[r · t,α];
5. R[r,Poss(t)] = R[r,πat ];
6. R[r, SF(t)] = R[r,ϕat ];
7. R[r,G(t1, . . . , tk)] = G(t1, . . . , tk) for rigid predicate G;
8. R[r, F (t1, . . . , tk)] for ﬂuent predicate F is deﬁned inductively on r by:
(a) R[〈 〉, F (t1, . . . , tk)] = F (t1, . . . , tk);
(b) R[r · t, F (t1, . . . , tk)] = R[r, (γF )at v1t1 . . . vktk ];
9. R[r, (t1 = t2)] = (t1 = t2) if t1 and t2 do not mention functional ﬂuents;
10. R[r, ( f (n1, . . . ,nk) = n)] for functional ﬂuent f is deﬁned inductively by:
(a) R[〈 〉, ( f (n1, . . . ,nk) = n)] = ( f (n1, . . . ,nk) = n);
(b) R[r · t, ( f (n1, . . . ,nk) = n)] = ∃y.(γ f )at v1n1 . . . vknk ∧ (y = n).
Note that this deﬁnition uses the right-hand sides of the precondition, successor state, and sense condition axioms
from Σ .
It is not hard to show that R always transforms a bounded objective formula into a ﬂuent formula.
Lemma 2. Let α be a bounded objective formula and r a sequence of action variables or standard names. Then there is a unique ﬂuent
formula φ such that R[r,α] = φ .
Proof. The proof is simple but tedious and we will skip the details here. Perhaps the only interesting aspect is the structure
of the proof itself, which is also used in other proofs of properties of regression below. First, the lemma is proved for static
formulas only. This is achieved by an induction on the length of r and a sub-induction on the length of α, counting the
number of logical operators and where occurrences of Poss(t) and SF(t) are counted as the length of πat + 1 and ϕat + 1,
respectively. Note, in particular, that the induction is well-behaved because the formulas π , ϕ , γF , and γ f are themselves
ﬂuent formulas, that is, they are static and mention neither Poss nor SF .
Having proved the lemma for static α, the case of bounded formulas is established by another simple induction on the
number of [t]-operators in α. 
Using the semantics of ES , we will now reprove Reiter’s Regression Theorem, and show that it is possible to reduce
reasoning with formulas that contain [t] operators to reasoning with ﬂuent formulas in the initial state.
We begin by deﬁning for any world w and basic action theory Σ another world wΣ which is like w except that it
satisﬁes the Σpre, Σsense, and Σpost sentences of Σ .
Deﬁnition 7. Let w be a world, z ∈ Z , and Σ a basic action theory with ﬂuents F . Then wΣ is a world satisfying the
following conditions:
10 See also the proof of Lemma 6 below, where this is needed to establish the induction for ∀.
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2. for predicate F ∈ F , wΣ [F (n1, . . . ,nk), z] is deﬁned inductively:
(a) wΣ [F (n1, . . . ,nk), 〈 〉] = w[F (n1, . . . ,nk), 〈 〉];
(b) wΣ [F (n1, . . . ,nk), z ·m] = 1 iff wΣ, z |
 (γF )amv1n1 . . . vknk ;
3. for function f ∈ F , wΣ [ f (n1, . . . ,nk), z] is deﬁned inductively:
(a) wΣ [ f (n1, . . . ,nk), 〈 〉] = w[ f (n1, . . . ,nk), 〈 〉];
(b) wΣ [ f (n1, . . . ,nk), z ·m] = n iff wΣ, z |
 (γ f )am yn v1n1 . . . vknk ;
4. wΣ [Poss(n), z] = 1 iff wΣ, z |
 πan ;
5. wΣ [SF(n), z] = 1 iff wΣ, z |
 ϕan .
Note that this again uses the π , γ , and ϕ formulas from Σ . Then we get the following simple lemmas11:
Lemma 3. For any w, wΣ exists and is uniquely deﬁned.
Proof. wΣ clearly exists. The uniqueness follows from the fact that π and ϕ are ﬂuent formulas and that for all ﬂuents
in F , once their initial values are ﬁxed, then the values after any number of actions are uniquely determined by Σpost. 
Lemma 4. If w |
 Σuna ∪ Σ0 then wΣ |
 Σ .
Proof. Directly from the deﬁnition of wΣ , we have that wΣ |
 ∀aPoss(a) ≡ π , wΣ |
 ∀aSF(a) ≡ ϕ , wΣ |
 ∀a∀x[a]F (x)
≡ γF , and wΣ |
 ∀a∀x∀y[a] f (x) = y ≡ γ f . 
Lemma 5. If w |
 Σ then w = wΣ .
Proof. If w |
 ∀a.Poss(a) ≡ π , w |
 ∀aSF(a) ≡ ϕ , w |
 ∀a∀x[a]F (x) ≡ γ f , and w |
 ∀a∀x∀y[a] f (x) = y ≡ γ f , then w
satisﬁes the deﬁnition of wΣ . 
The following property of regression is used to prove the main lemma needed for the Regression Theorem. Given a
sequence of action variables or standard names r, let rxn denote r with all occurrences of variable x replaced by standard
name n.
Lemma 6. For any bounded objective formula α and sequence of action variables or standard names r, R[r,α]xn = R[rxn,αxn].
Proof. The proof is long but simple and follows the structure of the proof of Lemma 2. Here we only consider static α and
three cases: ﬂuent predicates, assuming that the lemma holds for |r| = k−1, Poss and ∀, assuming in the sub-induction that
the lemma holds for formulas of length m− 1.
1. Let r = r′ · t . Then R[r, F (t)]xn = R[r′, γF at ut ]xn (def. of R) = R[r′xn , (γF at ut )xn] (by induction) = R[r′xn , (γF atxn
u
txn )] (since x not
in γF ) = R[(r′ · t)xn, F (t)xn].
2. R[r,Poss(t)]xn = R[r,πat ]xn (deﬁnition of R) = R[rxn, (πat )xn] (by induction, as πat is of length m− 1) = R[rxn, (πatxn )] (since
π does not mention x) = R[rxn,Poss(t)xn].
3. R[r,∀y.α]xn = (∀y.R[r,α])xn = ∀y.R[r,α]xn (since x = y) = ∀y.R[rxn,αxn] (by induction on |α|) = R[rxn, (∀y.α)xn]. 
Lemma 7. Let α be any bounded, objective sentence in NF and z ∈ Z .
Then w |
 R[z,α] iff wΣ, z |
 α.
Proof. As before, the proof is rather straightforward and uses the same induction scheme as Lemma 2. Assuming the lemma
holds for z of length k − 1, we only consider two cases, atoms with functional ﬂuents and ∀.
1. Note that, by the deﬁnition of NF , ground atoms mentioning functional ﬂuents have the form f (n1, . . . ,nk) = n, where
n and ni are standard names. Then:
wΣ, z ·m |
 f (n1, . . . ,nk) = n iff (by deﬁnition of wΣ ),
wΣ, z |
 ∃y.(γ f )a v1mn1 . . . vknk ∧ y = n iff (by induction),
w |
 R[z,∃y.(γ f )a v1mn1 . . . vknk ∧ y = n] iff (by deﬁnition of R),
w |
 R[z ·m, f (n1, . . . ,nk) = n].
2. w |
 R[z,∀x.α] iff w |
 ∀x.R[z,α] iff w |
 R[z,α]xn for all n of the right sort iff (by Lemma 6), w |
 R[z,αxn] for all n
iff (by sub-induction on |α|), wΣ, z |
 αxn for all n iff wΣ, z |
 ∀x.α. 
11 As we only consider ﬁrst-order sentences here, the second-order variable map u is dropped everywhere.
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bounded sentence. Then R[α] is a ﬂuent sentence and satisﬁes
Σ |
 α iff Σuna ∪ Σ0 |
 R[α].
Proof. Suppose Σuna ∪Σ0 |
 R[α]. We prove that Σ |
 α. Let w be any world such that w |
 Σ . Then, w |
 Σuna ∪Σ0, and
so w |
 R[α]. By Lemma 7, wΣ |
 α. By Lemma 5, wΣ = w , and so w |
 α.
Conversely, suppose Σ |
 α. We prove that Σ0 |
 R[α]. Let w be any world such that w |
 Σuna ∪ Σ0. From Lemma 4,
wΣ |
 Σ , and so wΣ |
 α. By Lemma 7, w |
 R[α]. 
Note that the conciseness of this proof depends crucially on the fact that Lemma 7 is proved by induction over sentences,
which is possible only because quantiﬁcation is interpreted substitutionally.
4.2. Regressing knowledge
Let us now turn to the more general case of regression for bounded sentences which may refer to the agent’s knowledge.
As we discussed in Section 3, this means that we need to consider two basic action theories Σ and Σ ′ for what is true in
the world and for what the agent believes, respectively.
The following theorem can be thought of as a successor-state axiom for knowledge, which will allow us to extend
regression to formulas containing Know. Note that, in contrast to the successor state axioms for ﬂuents, this is a theorem of
the logic not a stipulation as part of a basic action theory:
Theorem 4. |
[a]Know(α) ≡
SF(a) ∧ Know(Poss(a) ∧ SF(a) ⊃ [a]α) ∨
¬SF(a) ∧ Know(Poss(a) ∧ ¬SF(a) ⊃ [a]α).
Proof. For both directions of the equivalence we will only consider the case where ¬SF(n) holds for an arbitrary action
name n. The other case is completely analogous.
To prove the only-if direction, let e,w, z |
 [n]Know(αan) for action name n. We write α′ for αan . Suppose e,w, z |
¬SF(n). It suﬃces to show that e,w, z |
 Know(Poss(n) ∧ ¬SF(n) ⊃ [n]α′). So suppose w ′ z w , w ′ ∈ e, w ′[Poss(n), z] = 1,
and w ′[SF(n), z] = 0. Thus w ′[SF(n), z] = w[SF(n), z] and, hence, w ′ z·n w . Since e,w, z |
 [n]Know(α′) by assumption,
e,w ′, z · n |
 α′ , from which e,w ′, z |
 [n]α′ follows.
Conversely, let e,w, z |
 ¬SF(n) ∧ Know(Poss(n) ∧ ¬SF(n) ⊃ [n]α′). We need to show that e,w, z |
 [n]Know(α′), that is,
e,w, z · n |
 Know(α′). Let w ′ z·n w and w ′ ∈ e. Then w ′[Poss(n), z] = 1 and w ′[SF(n), z] = w[SF(n), z] = 0 by assumption.
Hence e,w ′, z |
 Poss(n) ∧ ¬SF(n). Therefore, by assumption, e,w ′, z · n |
 α′ , from which e,w, z |
 [n]Know(α′) follows. 
We consider this a successor state axiom for knowledge in the sense that it tells us for any action a what will be known
after doing a in terms of what was true before. Like [39], it makes the simplifying assumption that all actions are known to
the agent. Unlike [39], it is formalized without a ﬂuent for the knowledge accessibility relation, which would have required
situation terms in the language. In this case, knowledge after a depends on what was known before doing a about what the
future would be like after doing a, contingent on the action being possible and the sensing information provided by a.12
For example, if after doing sonar the robot knows it is close to the wall, then before doing sonar, the robot already knew a
conditional: if the sonar returns a 1 on completion, then this indicates that the robot will be close to the wall.
We are now ready to extend regression to deal with knowledge. Instead of being deﬁned relative to a basic action
theory Σ , the regression operator R will be deﬁned relative to a pair of basic action theories 〈Σ ′,Σ〉 where, as above,
Σ ′ represents the beliefs of the agent. We allow Σ and Σ ′ to differ arbitrarily and indeed to contradict each other, so that
agents may have false beliefs about what the world is like, including its dynamics.13 The idea is to regress wrt Σ outside
of Know operators and wrt Σ ′ inside. To be able to distinguish between these cases, R now carries the two basic action
theories with it as extra arguments.
Rules 1–10 of the new regression operator R are exactly as before (Deﬁnition 6) except for the extra arguments Σ ′
and Σ . Then we add the following:
11. R[Σ ′,Σ, r,Know(α)] is deﬁned inductively on r by:
(a) R[Σ ′,Σ, 〈 〉,Know(α)] = Know(R[Σ ′,Σ ′, 〈 〉,α]);
(b) R[Σ ′,Σ, r · t,Know(α)] = R[Σ ′,Σ, r, βat ], where β is the right-hand side of the equivalence in Theorem 4.
12 Note that by this account, after performing an impossible action, the agent believes that the action was possible. This is perhaps undesirable, but this
anomaly arises only in non-legal situations.
13 This is like [19] but in contrast to Scherl and Levesque [39], who can only handle true belief. While we allow for false beliefs, we continue to use the
terms knowledge and belief interchangeably.
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w ∈ e} for a given epistemic state e and basic action theory Σ :
Lemma 8. If e |
 Know(Σuna ∪ Σ0) then eΣ |
 Know(Σ).
Proof. Let e |
 Know(Σuna ∪Σ0), that is, for all w , if w ∈ e then w |
 Σuna ∪Σ0. We need to show that for all w , if w ∈ eΣ
then w |
 Σ .
Let w ∈ eΣ . By deﬁnition, there is a w ′ ∈ e such that w = w ′Σ . Since w ′ |
 Σuna ∪ Σ0, by Lemma 4, w ′Σ |
 Σ , that is,
w |
 Σ . 
We now turn to the generalization of Lemma 7 for knowledge.
Lemma 9. e,w |
 R[Σ ′,Σ, z,α] iff eΣ ′ ,wΣ, z |
 α.
Proof. The proof is by induction on z with a sub-induction on α.
Let z = 〈〉. The proof for Poss, SF , ﬂuent atoms, and the connectives ¬, ∧, and ∀ is exactly analogous to Lemma 7.
For formulas Know(α) we have:
eΣ ′ |
 Know(α) iff
for all w ∈ eΣ ′ , eΣ ′ ,w |
 α iff (by deﬁnition of eΣ ′ ),
for all w ∈ e, eΣ ′ ,wΣ ′ |
 α iff (by induction),
for all w ∈ e, e,w, |
 R[Σ ′,Σ ′, 〈 〉,α] iff
e |
 Know(R[Σ ′,Σ ′, 〈 〉,α]) iff (by deﬁnition of R),
e |
 R[Σ ′,Σ, 〈 〉,Know(α)].
This concludes the base case z = 〈〉.
Now consider the case of z ·n, which again is proved by a sub-induction on α. The proof is exactly like the sub-induction
for the base case except for Know, for which we have the following:
eΣ ′ ,wΣ, z · n |
 Know(α) iff (by Theorem 4),
eΣ ′ ,wΣ, z |
 βan (where the β is from Theorem 4)
iff (by the main induction),
e,w |
 R[Σ ′,Σ, z, βan ] iff (by deﬁnition of R),
e,w |
 R[Σ ′,Σ, z · n,Know(α)],
which completes the proof. 
Finally, here is the general regression theorem:
Theorem 5 (Generalized regression). Let Σ and Σ ′ be basic action theories, and α be a bounded sentence. Then R[α] is a static
sentence and satisﬁes
Σ ∧ Know(Σ ′) |
 α iff Σuna ∪ Σ0 ∧ Know
(
Σuna ∪ Σ ′0
) |
 R[α].
Proof. To prove the only-if direction, let us suppose that Σ ∧ Know(Σ ′) |
 α and that e,w |
 Σuna ∪Σ0 ∧ Know(Σuna ∪Σ ′0).
Thus w |
 Σuna ∪ Σ0 and, by Lemma 4, wΣ |
 Σ . Also, e |
 Know(Σuna ∪ Σ ′0) and thus, by Lemma 8, eΣ ′ |
 Know(Σ ′).
(Note that Σuna is the same for both Σ and Σ ′ .) Therefore, eΣ ′ ,wΣ |
 Σ ∧ Know(Σ ′). By assumption, eΣ ′ ,wΣ |
 α and, by
Lemma 9, e,w |
 R[α].
Conversely, suppose Σuna ∪ Σ0 ∧ Know(Σuna ∪ Σ ′0) |
 R[α] and let e,w |
 Σ ∧ Know(Σ ′). Then w |
 Σuna ∪ Σ0 and
e |
 Know(Σuna ∪Σ ′0). Then, by assumption, e,w |
 R[α]. Then eΣ ′ ,wΣ |
 α by Lemma 9. By Lemma 5, wΣ = w and, since
e |
 Know(Σ ′), eΣ ′ = e. Therefore, e,w |
 α. 
This theorem shows that determining what is true and what is known after any (bounded) number of actions have
occurred can always be reduced to reasoning about what is true and known in the initial state.
In order to deal with our robot example, we need to go a little beyond this as we may want to make assumptions about
what the robot does not know as in
Σ ∧ Know(Σ ′) ∧ ∀x.¬Know(distance = x) |
 [sonar][backward]¬Know(Close).
The following corollary shows that we can deal with such cases without any problems.
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Σ ∧ Know(Σ ′) ∧ γ |
 α iff Σuna ∪ Σ0 ∧ Know
(
Σuna ∪ Σ ′0
) ∧ γ |
 R[α].
Proof. The proof makes use of the fact that for any static formula γ , R[γ ] = γ . Σ ∧Know(Σ ′)∧γ |
 α iff Σ ∧Know(Σ ′) |

γ ⊃ α iff Σ ∧ Know(Σ ′) |
 R[γ ⊃ α] (by the regression theorem) iff Σ ∧ Know(Σ ′) |
 γ ⊃ R[α] (because R leaves γ as is)
iff Σ ∧ Know(Σ ′) |
 γ ⊃ R[α]. 
5. Mapping to the situation calculus
How do we know that the semantics of ES is correct? In this section, we argue that it is indeed correct by showing how
formulas α in ES can be translated in a direct way to formulas α∗ in the situation calculus as deﬁned by Reiter. We assume
that this language has functional and relational ﬂuents, functions and predicates that are not ﬂuents, the distinguished
constant S0, function do, binary predicate  over situations, predicates Poss and SF , and a binary predicate K for knowledge.
We take Knows(α,σ ) in the situation calculus as an abbreviation for the formula ∀s(K (s, σ ) ⊃ αnows ), where αnows is the
result of replacing by s in α every occurrence of now that is not within the scope of a further Knows.14
Perhaps the most desirable and simplest outcome of a translation from ES to the situation calculus would be that
|
 α iff Σ |
FOL α∗,
where |
 is validity in ES , Σ is the set of foundational axioms of the situation calculus, and |
FOL is ordinary classical
logical consequence. Unfortunately, we do not get exactly this correspondence for a variety of reasons we will discuss
below. But we do get something close:
|
 α iff Σ ∪ Υ |
FOL α∗,
where Υ is a set of ﬁve axioms that we will justify separately.
Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that the foundational axioms Σ are actually completely irrelevant as far as the
fragment of the situation calculus as deﬁned by our translation is concerned. In other words, we also obtain
|
 α iff Υ |
FOL α∗.
Below, we will ﬁrst prove this result and then show that only small modiﬁcations are needed to obtain a proof for the
case when foundational axioms are assumed as well. To establish these results it will be necessary to work with ordinary
Tarski models of sentences of the situation calculus. As we argued in the beginning, this is diﬃcult and painstaking, and is
indeed one of the main reasons to prefer ES over the situation calculus. But here there is no alternative. So while the proof
of the theorems is quite laborious, we remind the reader that this can be thought of as a ﬁnal reckoning for a formalism
that is unworkable semantically.
5.1. The translation
Before describing Υ , we present the translation from ES into the situation calculus. In the simplest case, the
idea is that a formula like distance = 6, where distance is a ﬂuent, will be mapped to the situation calculus formula
distance(S0) = 6, where we have restored the distinguished situation term S0 for the ﬂuent. Similarly, the formula
[forward]¬(distance = 6) will be mapped to ¬(distance(do(forward, S0)) = 6), and (distance > 0) will be mapped to
∀s′(S0  s′ ⊃ distance(s′) > 0). For knowledge, Know(distance > 0) will be mapped to Knows(distance(now) > 0, S0) which
is an abbreviation for ∀s′(K (s′, S0) ⊃ distance(s′) > 0). So ES formulas can be thought of as “situation-suppressed” (in
situation-calculus terminology) and the ∗ mapping we will deﬁne restores the situation argument to the ﬂuents, leaving the
rigids unchanged.
More precisely, we have the following:
Deﬁnition 8. Let α be any term or formula of ES without standard names. The expression α∗ is deﬁned as α[S0] where,
for any situation term σ , α[σ ] is deﬁned inductively by:
1. v[σ ], where v is a ﬁrst-order variable, is v;
2. g(t1, . . . , tk)[σ ], where g is a rigid function, predicate, or second-order variable, is g(t1[σ ], . . . , tk[σ ]);
3. f (t1, . . . , tk)[σ ], where f is a ﬂuent function, predicate, or second-order variable is f (t1[σ ], . . . , tk[σ ], σ );
4. (t1 = t2)[σ ] is (t1[σ ] = t2[σ ]);
5. ([t]α)[σ ] is α[do(t[σ ], σ )];
6. (α ∧ β)[σ ] is (α[σ ] ∧ β[σ ]);
14 In some versions of the situation calculus, the argument to Knows is a formula α where situations are suppressed. In that case, αnows should be
understood as restoring s as the situation argument.
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8. (∀v.α)[σ ] is ∀v.α[σ ];
9. (∀V .α)[σ ] is ∀V .α[σ ];
10. (α)[σ ] is ∀s′(σ  s′ ⊃ α[s′]);
11. Know(α)[σ ] is Knows(α[now], σ ).
Note that the translation of α introduces quantiﬁcation over situations, where the introduced variable s′ is assumed to
be one that does not appear in situation term σ .
5.2. The axioms and the embedding theorem
The axioms we assume in Υ are the following:
1. Domain of objects is countably inﬁnite15;
2. Domain of actions is countably inﬁnite (as above);
3. Equality is the identity relation16:
∀x∀y.(x= y) ≡ ∀Q (Q (x) ≡ Q (y));
4. Less-than over situations: ∀s∀s′.(s  s′) ≡ ∀P (· · · ⊃ P (s, s′)),
where the ellipsis stands for the universal closure of
[
P (s1, s1)
] ∧
[
P (s2, s3) ⊃ P
(
s2,do(a, s3)
)];
5. The K predicate: ∀s′∀s.K (s′, s) ≡ ∀P (· · · ⊃ P (s′, s)),
where the ellipsis stands for the universal closure of
[
K (s1, S0) ⊃ P (s1, S0)
] ∧
[
P (s1, s3) ∧ P (s2, s3) ⊃ P (s1, s2)
] ∧
[
P (s1, s2) ∧ Poss(a, s1) ∧ SF(a, s1) ≡ SF(a, s2) ⊃ P
(
do(a, s1),do(a, s2)
)]
.
Axioms (1) and (2) talk about the cardinality of the set of objects and actions respectively: they are both countable and in-
ﬁnite. The countability aspect is not very controversial. In the ﬁrst-order case, every satisﬁable set of sentences is satisﬁable
in a countable domain, and we do not expect users of the situation calculus to use second-order logic to defeat this. Note
that this does not rule out having theories that talk about real numbers or other continuous phenomena; it simply rules
out using second-order logic to force the interpretations of these theories to be uncountable. We can, however, imagine
contexts where ﬁniteness might be desirable. In such cases, we can introduce a new predicate O and instead of asserting
that there are ﬁnitely many objects, assert that there are ﬁnitely many objects in O .
As for axiom (3), it is hard imagining anyone taking the negation of this one seriously. The usual ﬁrst-order axioma-
tization of equality is often enough, but the intent is invariably for the equality symbol to be understood as the identity
relation, which this second-order axiom ensures.
Axiom (4) uses second-order logic to deﬁne the  relation as reachability using do. It does not say anything about S0
nor about situations that cannot be reached using do. As it turns out, we do not need to stipulate anything about them.
(See the conclusion for more on this.)
Finally axiom (5) is a second order deﬁnition of the K predicate in terms of the value it has at S0. This is just another
way of capturing the successor state axiom for K introduced by Scherl and Levesque [39], and the added machinery to
make Knows be a weak-S5 operator [14]. Other knowledge operators are possible in the situation calculus, but weak-S5 and
its extensions (such as strong-S5) are the most often used.
The last missing piece are the axioms asserting the countability of objects and actions. Here is one way of specifying
these for objects:
∃Q .∀xQ (x) ∧ Inf (Q ) ∧ Cnt(Q ) where
Cnt(Q )
def= ∀Q ′(Q ′  Q ∧ Inf (Q ′) ⊃ Q  Q ′)
Inf (Q )
def= ∃Q ′.Q ′  Q ∧ Q  Q ′
15 See the precise logical rendering of this below.
16 It is not hard to show that this second-order deﬁnition entails all the usual properties like reﬂexivity and substitution of equals for equals.
156 G. Lakemeyer, H.J. Levesque / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 142–164Q  Q ′ def= ∀x(Q (x) ⊃ Q ′(x)) ∧ ∃x(Q (x) ∧ ¬Q ′(x))
Q  Q ′ def= ∃R.∀x(Q (x) ⊃ ∃yQ ′(y) ∧ R(x, y)) ∧ ∀x, x′, y.R(x, y) ∧ R(x′, y) ⊃ x= x′.
Starting from the bottom, Q  Q ′ says that the set Q ′ is no smaller than Q , that is, there is a 1–1 mapping from Q to Q ′;
Q  Q ′ says that Q is a proper subset of Q ′; Inf (Q ) says that Q is inﬁnite if it contains a proper subset Q ′ which is no
smaller than Q itself; Cnt(Q ) says that Q is countable if every inﬁnite proper subset is no smaller than Q ; ﬁnally, the ﬁrst
line says that the set of all objects is countably inﬁnite (here x is assumed to be of type object). To assert the same for
actions we simply add another axiom of the form
∃Q .∀aQ (a) ∧ Inf (Q ) ∧ Cnt(Q ) where a is of type action.
With all the axioms in place we can now state our ﬁrst embedding theorem:
Theorem 6. Let α be any sentence of ES without standard names. Then
α is valid iff Υ |
FOL α∗.
The long and arduous proof of the theorem is left to Appendix A. If nothing else, it provides further evidence that
ordinary Tarski models of sentences of the situation calculus are cumbersome to work with.
An interesting aspect of the theorem is that it requires few assumptions about the nature of situations. For example,
Υ admits models where there are situations other than those reachable from S0 or the situations which are K -accessible
from S0. In contrast, Reiter’s foundational axioms Σ , which we will present in a moment, rule out such non-standard
models. In order to show that ES can be fully embedded in Reiter’s situation calculus, which requires the foundational
axioms, we still need to show that the above theorem continues to hold if we add Σ as additional assumptions on the
right-hand side of the theorem. Note that this is not immediately obvious as extra assumptions normally lead to more
entailments.
To see why this is not the case here, let us ﬁrst review the axioms Σ for the epistemic situation calculus from [36]:
1. do(a1, s1) = do(a2, s2) ⊃ a1 = a2 ∧ s1 = s2;
2. ∀Q .∀s.[Ini(s) ⊃ P (s)] ∧ ∀a, s.[Q (s) ⊃ Q (do(a, s))] ⊃ ∀s.Q (s), where Ini(s) def= ∀a∀s′.s = do(a, s′);
3. s do(a, s′) ≡ s  s′;
4. ¬s S0;
5. K (s′, s) ⊃ [Ini(s) ≡ Ini(s′)].
(1) is a unique names axiom for situations; the second-order axiom (2) deﬁnes the set of all situations to be those
reachable from an initial situation (Ini(s)) by a sequence of actions; (3) deﬁnes  as reachability (by a sequence of actions)
between situations; (4) says that no situation precedes S0; (5) says that an initial situation is K -accessible only from another
initial situation. Note that Ini(S0) is a logical consequence of Σ .
The intuitive reason why we can add these axioms to Theorem 6 without invalidating it is because they assert properties
of situations which we cannot even express in ES , and hence they are not in the image of the translation. For example,
since S0 is not part of the language, we simply cannot say that nothing precedes S0. In other words, while we certainly
have Σ ∪ Υ |
FOL ∀s.¬s S0 and Υ |
FOL ∀s.¬s S0, this does not matter for the theorem, as there is no α ∈ ES such that
α∗ is equivalent to ∀s.¬s S0. Hence we obtain:
Theorem 7. Let α be any sentence of ES without standard names. Then
α is valid iff Σ ∪ Υ |
FOL α∗.
The theorem establishes that ES is indeed a fragment of Reiter’s situation calculus. As ES itself seems to be much more
workable, this then is perhaps the main signiﬁcance of the theorem: any property which we obtain for ES automatically
holds for the fragment of the original situation calculus given by our translation. And this fragment covers the main uses of
the situation calculus, in particular, Reiter’s basic action theories [36], and those dealing with knowledge [39]. We saw an
example in Section 3. In [24] we also showed that ES is expressive enough to capture the action language Golog [27].
What do we give up? As we have seen, the foundational axioms themselves cannot be expressed in ES . Another sentence
which has no straightforward counterpart in is
∃s∃s′.S0  s ∧ S0  s′ ∧
(
s = s′) ∧ F (s) ≡ F (s′),
which says that two distinct situations are reachable that agree on the truth value of F . It’s the equality between situations
that presents a problem here. However, as we showed in [24], sentences like these can be expressed if we add to ES an
explicit encoding of action sequences. Indeed, with this trick we were able to come up with a backward translation from
the situation calculus to ES , which covers the entire rooted situation calculus with knowledge. Here rooted means that
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particular, that the rooted situation calculus without knowledge is equivalent to Reiter’s original version (simply take σ to
be S0). So, with a little bit of extra effort, ES has almost the same expressive power as all of the situation calculus.
6. Related work
While the situation calculus has received a lot of attention in the reasoning about action community, there are, of
course, a number of alternative formalisms, including close relatives like the ﬂuent calculus [13,40] and more distant cousins
described in [16,9,38].
The closest approaches to ours are perhaps those concerned with reasoning about action based on dynamic logic [10].
For example, De Giacomo and Lenzerini [4] and later Demolombe et al. [6], whose work extends [3], show how to import
Reiter’s solution to the frame problem into dynamic logic. There are also epistemic extensions of dynamic logic such as [11]
and [5]. In the language of [11], it is possible to express things like [forward][sonar]Know(Close) using an almost identical
syntax and where Know also has a possible-world semantics. While most approaches remain propositional, there are some
ﬁrst-order treatments such as [5,6], which, like ES , are inspired by the desire to capture fragments of the situation calculus
in modal logic.
Although they do not consider epistemic notions, the work by [1] is relevant as it reconstructs a version of the situation
calculus in Hybrid Logic [1], a variant of modal logic which was inspired by the work on tense logic by Prior [34]. In
a sense, though, this work goes only part of the way as an explicit reference to situations within the logic is retained.
To us this presents a disadvantage when moving to an epistemic extension. As we said in the beginning, the problem is
that the epistemic situation calculus requires us to consider uncountably many situations, which precludes a substitutional
interpretation of quantiﬁcation.
7. Only knowing and actions
In previous work, for example [21,22], we have used the concept of only-knowing as a way of capturing the idea that
a sentence is not only believed by an agent, but all that is believed by the agent. This idea has a number of applications,
including reconstructing some aspects of nonmonotonic reasoning [25].
One application of only-knowing for our purposes is to provide a convenient way of specifying what is not known:
instead of saying that an agent believes some sentences (such as a basic action theory) and also stipulating that she does
not believe certain other sentences (as we did in the robot example in Section 3), it will be suﬃcient to say that the basic
action theory is all that the agent believes. It will then follow logically that certain other sentences are not believed. So for
example, in the robot example, instead of saying
The following are logical entailments of
Σ ∧ Know(Σ ′) ∧ ∀x.¬Know(distance = x),
where we had to say explicitly that the agent did not know anything about the distance to the wall, it will be suﬃcient to
say
The following are logical entailments of
(
Σ ∧ OKnow(Σ ′)),
where OKnow(Σ ′) will be how we say in the language that Σ ′ is all that is known. Once this operator is properly deﬁned,
we will then obtain as a property that
|
 OKnow(Σ ′) ⊃ ∀x.¬Know(distance = x),
which then allows us to carry out the example. In fact, for any two ﬂuent sentences φ and ψ such that |
 (φ ⊃ ψ), we will
have that |
 (OKnow(φ) ⊃ ¬Know(ψ)).
But how should this operator be generalized from our previous work on only-knowing in the static case? In an earlier
version of this paper [23], we proposed a deﬁnition that had some interesting properties, but some drawbacks as well. We
now believe that the deﬁnition should be the following:
• e,w, z,u |
 OKnow(α) iff for every w ′ , w ′ ∈ ewz iff ewz ,w ′, 〈 〉,u |
 α,
where
ewz is deﬁned as
{
w ′z
∣∣ w ′ ∈ e and w ′ z w
}
, and
wz is deﬁned by wz
[
H(n), z′] = w[H(n), z · z′].
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addition, it appears to have some very nice connections to the concept of the progression of basic action theories [20,28,41].
One complication here is that rigid predicates (predicates whose truth values are unchanging and known) appear to present
problems for this otherwise well-behaved deﬁnition. However, we leave this exploration for future research, and do not
pursue the matter here.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have isolated a fragment of the situation calculus with knowledge (presented using a modal syntax) and
showed it to have a relatively simple model theoretic semantics based on possible worlds. We showed that this semantics
allowed clear and direct proofs of certain properties of interest. We also showed that it coincided with the use of the
situation calculus by Reiter provided we made ﬁve assumptions: there are countably inﬁnitely many actions and objects,
the = symbol denotes identity, the  symbol denotes reachability using do, and knowledge satisﬁes the properties of a
quantiﬁed weak S5. Given these assumptions, practitioners are then free to use either the modal syntax we have presented
here or the original situation calculus syntax introduced by McCarthy and can expect to reap the same semantic rewards.
The subset of the situation calculus studied here might be thought to owe more to the dialect studied by Ray Reiter and
coworkers [36] than to the less constrained dialect ﬁrst envisioned by John McCarthy [29]. For example, we lean heavily
on the use of basic action theories and regression, as popularized by Reiter. However, this is not quite right. A careful
reading of the embedding theorem, which shows how a fragment of the classical situation calculus can be realized in ES ,
demonstrates quite clearly that we get an exact correspondence without requiring all the foundational axioms proposed
by Reiter. These axioms (including the second-order induction axiom) were used by Reiter to constrain the space of all
situations to be a tree rooted at S0. In our embedding, we do not rule out “non-standard models” where, for example, S0 is
the result of performing some action. We can get away with this heresy because, without situation terms in the language,
such non-standard anomalies cannot be expressed! Thus, from the point of view of the situation calculus, we can leave the
space of situations unconstrained, just as McCarthy did, without jeopardizing the advantages of the Reiter account.
So in the end, despite the modal syntax which is admittedly somewhat at odds with McCarthy’s aesthetic, the situation
calculus dialect presented here is in fact closer semantically to the vision ﬁrst presented by McCarthy and subsequently
found to be so useful by so many.
Appendix A. Proof of the Embedding Theorem
We need some notation for talking about classical Tarski structures and truth. Suppose we are given a Tarski structure
M deﬁned by a domain D and interpretations for the constant, function and predicate symbols of the situation calculus
language. We assume that D = Dsit ∪ Dact ∪ Dobj , where Dsit is the domain of situations, Dact is the domain of actions,
and Dobj is the domain of objects. We use the following notation: if c is a constant symbol, then cM is the element of D
denoted by c; hM is the function from the Cartesian product over D of the appropriate arity to D denoted by h; and HM
is the relation (subset of the Cartesian product) over D of the appropriate arity denoted by H .
Let μ be a mapping from ordinary variables to D and from second-order variables to relations over D. For any ordinary
variable v and element d of D, μ{x/d} is the variable map just like μ except that x is mapped to d. Similarly, for any
second-order variable P and relation Z over D of the right arity, μ{P/Z} is the variable map just like μ except that P is
mapped to Z .
More notation: For any term t , ‖t‖Mμ is the element of D denoted by t in the classical sense, and M,μ |
 α means that
α is true in the classical sense for structure M, when the free variables are interpreted by μ. We will omit the μ when
nothing depends on the variable map.
Let M be a Tarski structure satisfying the axioms in Υ over the domain D = Dsit ∪ Dact ∪ Dobj . Let ι0 = SM0 andDstrt = {ι0} ∪ {ds ∈ Dsit | M,μ{s/ds} |
 K (s, S0)}. Dstrt should be thought of as starting situations consisting of S0 and
whatever is K -accessible from S0. These play the role of the initial situations in Reiter’s situation calculus except that they
may have predecessors because we do not require Reiter’s foundational axioms. Let e be an epistemic state, and assume
that we are given three mappings ω ∈ [Dstrt → W ], θ ∈ [N → Dact ∪Dobj], and π ∈ [Z ×Dstrt → Dsit]. Suppose further that
the following properties are satisﬁed:
1. θ is 1–1, onto, and sort preserving;
2. ω is onto e (that is, e ⊆ the image of ω);
3. for any rigid function symbol g ,
gM
(
θ(n1), . . . , θ(nk)
) = θ(ω(ι)[g(n1, . . . ,nk), 〈 〉
]);
4. for any ﬂuent function symbol f ,
f M
(
θ(n1), . . . , θ(nk),π(z, ι)
) = θ(ω(ι)[ f (n1, . . . ,nk), z
]);
5. for any rigid predicate symbol G ,
GM = {〈θ(n1), . . . , θ(nk)
〉 ∣∣ ω(ι)
[
G(n1, . . . ,nk), 〈 〉
] = 1};
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FM = {〈θ(n1), . . . , θ(nk),π(z, ι)
〉 ∣∣ ω(ι)
[
F (n1, . . . ,nk), z
] = 1};
7. doM(θ(n),π(z, ι)) = π(z · n, ι);
8. =M is identity;
9. M= {(π(z, ι),π(z · z′, ι))};
10. KM = {(π(z, ι′),π(z, ι)) | ω(ι′) ∈ e and ω(ι′) z ω(ι)}.
In what follows, we will consider expressions (terms or formulas) of ES whose free ﬁrst-order variables appear in the list
x1, . . . , xm . We will consider substituting these variables by standard names n1, . . . ,nm of the right sort. For ease of reading,
for any term or formula α, we write α+ to mean αx1n1 . . .
xm
nm . In the situation calculus, for a variable map μ, we write μ
+ to
mean μ{x1/θ(n1), . . . , xm/θ(nm), s/π(z, ι)}, where the variable s, the z ∈ Z and the ι ∈ Dstrt will be determined by context.
Then we get the following:
Lemma 10. Let t be a term of ES without standard names whose free variables are among the x1, . . . , xm. Let ι ∈ Dstrt , z ∈ Z , and
w = ω(ι). Then, given the properties above,
∥∥t[s]∥∥
μ+ = θ
(∣∣t+
∣∣z
w
)
.
Proof. By induction on t .
If t is the variable xi , then ‖t[s]‖μ+ = ‖xi‖μ+ = θ(ni) = θ(|t+|zw).
If t is of the form g(t1, . . . , tk) then we have the following:
∥∥t[s]∥∥
μ+ =
(
by deﬁnition of t[s])
∥∥g
(
t1[s], . . . , tk[s]
)∥∥
μ+ = (by deﬁnition of denotation)
gM
(∥∥t1[s]
∥∥
μ+ , . . . ,
∥∥tk[s]
∥∥
μ+
) = (by induction)
gM
(
θ
(∣∣t+1
∣∣z
w
)
, . . . , θ
(∣∣t+k
∣∣z
w
)) = (by Property 3)
θ
(
w
[
g
(∣∣t+1
∣∣z
w , . . . ,
∣∣t+k
∣∣z
w
)
, 〈 〉]) = (by the rigidity constraint)
θ
(
w
[
g
(∣∣t+1
∣∣z
w , . . . ,
∣∣t+k
∣∣z
w
)
, z
]) = (by deﬁnition of coreference)
θ
(∣∣g(t1, . . . , tk)+
∣∣z
w
)
.
If t is of the form f (t1, . . . , tk) then we have the following:
∥∥t[s]∥∥
μ+ =
(
by deﬁnition of t[s])
∥∥ f
(
t1[s], . . . , tk[s], s
)∥∥
μ+ = (by deﬁnition of denotation)
f M
(∥∥t1[s]
∥∥
μ+ , . . . ,
∥∥tk[s]
∥∥
μ+ ,π(z, ι)
) = (by induction)
f M
(
θ
(∣∣t+1
∣∣z
w
)
, . . . , θ
(∣∣t+k
∣∣z
w
)
,π(z, ι)
) = (by Property 4)
θ
(
w
[
f
(∣∣t+1
∣∣z
w , . . . ,
∣∣t+k
∣∣z
w
)
, z
]) = (by deﬁnition of coreference)
θ
(∣∣ f (t1, . . . , tk)+
∣∣z
w
)
. 
Lemma 11. Let t be a term of ES without standard names whose free variables are among the x1, . . . , xm. Let ι ∈ Dstrt , z ∈ Z , and
w = ω(ι). Then, given the properties above,
∥∥do
(
t[s], s)∥∥
μ+ = π
(
z · ∣∣t+∣∣zw , ι
)
.
Proof. The proof is immediate from Property 7 and Lemma 10. 
Deﬁnition 9. For a given variable map μ let uμ be any ES variable map which satisﬁes the following:
1. for any rigid second-order variable V and any w and z, let
uμ
[
w, V (n1, . . . ,nk), z
] = 1 iff 〈θ(n1), . . . , θ(nk)
〉 ∈ μ(V );
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uμ
[
ω(ι), V (n1, . . . ,nk), z
] = 1 iff 〈θ(n1), . . . , θ(nk),π(z, ι)
〉 ∈ μ(V ).
Note that uμ is not necessarily completely speciﬁed for ﬂuent variables as there may be worlds in W which are not
in the image of ω. Let us call a world which is in the image of ω an ω-world. For example, all worlds in e are ω-worlds
because ω is assumed to be onto e (Property 2). Then we have the following:
Lemma 12. Let w = ω(ι) and let u1 and u2 be variable maps which agree on all values where the ﬁrst argument is an ω-world. Then
for all basic sentences α,
e,w, z,u1 |
 α iff e,w, z,u2 |
 α.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of α. All cases except second-order variables are immediate since w and
all worlds in e are ω-worlds.
Let e,w, z,u1 |
 ∀V .α. Then for all u′ , if u′ ∼V u1 then e,w, z,u′ |
 α. Now consider any u′′ ∼V u2. Then there clearly
is a u′ ∼V u1 which agrees with u′′ on V . Also, by deﬁnition, this u′ agrees with u1 on all other values and hence agrees
with u2 and therefore u′′ on all values for ω-worlds. Thus, by induction, e,w, z,u′′ |
 α. Since this holds for all u′′ ∼V u2,
we obtain e,w, z,u2 |
 ∀V .α. The other direction is completely symmetric. 
Lemma 13. e,w, z,uμ |
 ∀V .α iff for all relations Z over D (with arity and sorts given by V ), e,w, z,uμ{V /Z} |
 α.
Proof. We only consider ﬂuent variables V . (Rigids are a simpler special case.) For the only-if direction, suppose uμ{V /Z} is
given. Then there is a u′ ∼V uμ such that u′ agrees with uμ{V /Z} on V and, by deﬁnition of ∼V , also agrees with uμ{V /Z}
on all variables other than V on all ω-worlds. Hence uμ{V /Z} agrees with u′ on all ω-worlds and thus, by assumption and
Lemma 12, e,w, z,uμ{V /Z} |
 α.
Conversely, let u′ ∼V uμ . Consider
Z = {〈θ(n1), . . . , θ(nk),π(z, i)
〉 ∣∣ u′
[
ω(i), V (n1, . . . ,nk), z
] = 1 for all ι and z}.
Then u′ agrees with uμ{V /Z} on all ω-worlds and hence e,w, z,u′ |
 α by assumption and Lemma 12. Since this holds for
any u′ ∼V uμ , we obtain e,w, z,uμ |
 ∀V .α. 
Now we can put all the results together and prove the main lemma:
Lemma 14. Let α be a basic formula of ES with no standard names and whose free variables are among the x1, . . . , xm. Then, given
the properties above, for any variable map μ, any ES variable map uμ satisfying Deﬁnition 9, any situation variable s, any z ∈ Z , any
ι ∈ Dstrt and w = ω(ι),
e,w, z,uμ |
 α+ iff M,μ+ |
 α[s].
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of α. There are 12 cases:
1. For a formula of the form F (t1, . . . , tk):
e,w, z,uμ |
 F (t1, . . . , tk)+ iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
w[F (|t+1 |zw , . . . , |t+k |zw), z] = 1 iff (by Property 6)
〈θ(|t+1 |zw), . . . , θ(|t+k |zw),π(z, ι)〉 ∈ FM iff (by Lemma 10)
〈‖t1[s]‖μ+ , . . . ,‖tk[s]‖μ+ ,π(z, ι)
〉 ∈ FM iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
M,μ+ |
 F (t1[s], . . . , tk[s], s).
2. For a formula of the form G(t1, . . . , tk):
e,w, z,uμ |
 G(t1, . . . , tk)+ iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
w[G(|t+1 |zw , . . . , |t+k |zw), z] = 1 iff (by the rigidity constraint)
w[G(|t+1 |zw , . . . , |t+k |zw), 〈 〉] = 1 iff (by Property 5)
〈θ(|t+1 |zw), . . . , θ(|t+k |zw)〉 ∈ GM iff (by Lemma 10)
〈‖t1[s]‖μ+ , . . . ,‖tk[s]‖μ+〉 ∈ GM iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
M,μ+ |
 G(t1[s], . . . , tk[s], s).
3. For a formula of the form P (t1, . . . , tk):
e,w, z,uμ |
 P (t1, . . . , tk)+ iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
uμ[w, P (|t+1 |zw , . . . , |t+k |zw), z] = 1 iff (by deﬁnition of uμ)
〈θ(|t+|zw), . . . , θ(|t+|zw),π(z, ι)〉 ∈ μ+[P ] iff (by Lemma 10)1 k
G. Lakemeyer, H.J. Levesque / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 142–164 161〈‖t1[s]‖μ+ , . . . ,‖tk[s]‖μ+ ,π(z, ι)〉 ∈ μ+[P ] iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
M,μ+ |
 P (t1[s], . . . , tk[s], s).
4. For a formula of the form Q (t1, . . . , tk):
e,w, z,uμ |
 Q (t1, . . . , tk)+ iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
uμ[w, Q (|t+1 |zw , . . . , |t+k |zw), z] = 1 iff (by deﬁnition of uμ)
〈θ(|t+1 |zw), . . . , θ(|t+k |zw),π(z, ι)〉 ∈ μ+[Q ] iff (by Lemma 10)〈‖t1[s]‖μ+ , . . . ,‖tk[s]‖μ+ ,π(z, ι)〉 ∈ μ+[Q ] iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
M,μ+ |
 Q (t1[s], . . . , tk[s], s).
5. For a formula of the form (t1 = t2):
e,w, z,uμ |
 (t1 = t2)+ iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
|t+1 |zw = |t+2 |zw iff (by Property 1)
θ(|t+1 |zw) = θ(|t+2 |zw) iff (by Lemma 10)‖t1[s]‖μ+ = ‖t2[s]‖μ+ iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction and Property 8)
M,μ+ |
 (t1[s] = t2[s]).
6. For a formula of the form [t]α:
e,w, z,uμ |
 ([t]α)+ iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
e,w, z · |t+|zw ,uμ |
 α+ iff (by induction)
M,μ+{s′/π(z · |t+|zw , ι)} |
 α[s′] iff
for every τ ∈ Dsit , if τ = π(z · |t+|zw , ι), then M,μ+{s′/τ } |
 α[s′] iff (by Lemma 11)
for every τ ∈ Dsit , if τ = ‖do(t[s], s)‖μ+ , then M,μ+{s′/τ } |
 α[s′] iff
for every τ ∈ Dsit,M,μ+{s′/τ } |
 (s′ = do(t[s], s) ⊃ α[s′]) iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
M,μ+ |
 ∀s′(s′ = do(t[s], s) ⊃ α[s′]) iff
M,μ+ |
 α[do(t[s], s)] iff
M,μ+ |
 ([t]α)[s].
7. For a formula of the form (α ∧ β):
e,w, z,uμ |
 (α ∧ β)+ iff (by induction)
M,μ+ |
 (α ∧ β)[s].
8. For a formula of the form ¬α:
e,w, z,uμ |
 ¬α+ iff (by induction)
M,μ+ |
 ¬α[s].
9. For a formula of the form ∀v.α:
e,w, z,uμ |
 (∀v.α)+ iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
for all names n of the right sort, e,w, z,uμ |
 α+vn iff (by induction)
for all names n of the right sort, M,μ+{v/θ(n)} |
 α[s] iff (by Property 1)
for all d ∈ D of the right sort, M,μ+{v/d} |
 α[s] iff
(by deﬁnition of satisfaction) M,μ+ |
 ∀v.α[s].
10. For a formula of the form ∀V .α:
e,w, z,uμ |
 (∀V .α)+ iff (by Lemma 13)
for all relations Z over D, e,w, z,uμ{V /Z} |
 α+ iff (by induction)
for all rel. Z over D, M,μ+{V /Z} |
 α[s] iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
M,μ+ |
 ∀V .α[s].
11. For a formula of the form α:
e,w, z,uμ |
α+ iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
for all z′ ∈ Z , e,w, z · z′,uμ |
 α+ iff (by induction)
for all z′ ∈ Z , M,μ+{s′/π(z · z′, ι)} |
 α[s′] iff
for all τ ∈ Dsit, if there exists z′ ∈ Z such that τ = π(z · z′, ι), then M,μ+{s′/τ } |
 α[s′] iff (by Property 9)
for all τ ∈ Dsit, M,μ+{s′/τ )} |
 (s  s′ ⊃ α[s′]) iff
(by deﬁnition of satisfaction) M,μ+ |
 ∀s′(s  s′ ⊃ α[s′]).
12. For a formula of the form Know(α):
e,w, z,uμ |
 Know(α)+ iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
for all w ′ ∈ e, if w ′ z w, then e,w ′, z,uμ |
 α+ iff (by Property 2)
for all ω(ι′) ∈ e, if ω(ι′) z w, then e,ω(ι′), z,uμ |
 α+ iff (by induction)
for all ω(ι′) ∈ e, if ω(ι′) z w, then M,μ+{s′/π(z, ι′)} |
 α[s′] iff
for all τ ∈ Dsit, if there exists ι′ ∈ Dstrt such that τ = π(z, ι′) where ω(ι′) ∈ e and ω(ι′) z w,
then M,μ+{s′/τ } |
 α[s′] iff (by Property 10)
for all τ ∈ Dsit, M,μ+{s′/τ } |
 (K (s′, s) ⊃ α[s′]) iff (by deﬁnition of satisfaction)
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 ∀s′(K (s′, s) ⊃ α[s′]) iff
M,μ+ |
 Knows(α[now], s) iff
M,μ+ |
 Know(α)[s].
This completes the proof. 
With this lemma in place, we can now prove the correctness of the embedding of ES into the situation calculus:
Theorem 6. Let α be any basic sentence of ES without standard names. Then
α is valid iff Υ |
FOL α∗,
Proof. First assume that α is not valid. Then there is an e, w0 such that e,w0 |
 α. Deﬁne a Tarski structure as follows:
• The domain of M is D = Dobj ∪ Dact ∪ Dsit , where Dobj (resp. Dact) is the set of standard names of objects (resp.
actions), and Dsit = Z times W ;
• The ﬁxed vocabulary of M is deﬁned by:
– =M is the identity relation over D,
– SM0 = (〈 〉,w0),
– doM(n, (z,w)) = (z · n,w),
– M= {((z,w), (z · z′,w))},
– KM = {((z,w), (z,w0)) | w ∈ e and w z w0};
• for every rigid predicate symbol G ,
GM = {〈n1, . . . ,nk〉
∣∣ w0
[
G(n1, . . . ,nk), 〈 〉
] = 1};
• for every ﬂuent predicate symbol F (including Poss and SF),
FM = {〈n1, . . . ,nk, (z,w)〉
∣∣ w
[
F (n1, . . . ,nk), z
] = 1};
• for every rigid function symbol g ,
gM(n1, . . . ,nk) = w0
[
g(n1, . . . ,nk), 〈 〉
];
• for every ﬂuent function symbol f ,
f M
(
n1, . . . ,nk, (z,w)
) = w[g(n1, . . . ,nk), z
]
.
These deﬁnitions ensure that M satisﬁes Υ . Next, deﬁne the mappings θ , π, and ω by letting θ(n) = n, and for any
initial ι = (〈 〉,w), letting π(z, ι) = (z,w), and ω(ι) = w . This ensures that the properties needed for Lemma 14 are satisﬁed,
and so M |
 α∗ . Consequently, Υ |
FOL α∗.
Conversely, assume that Υ |
FOL α∗ . Then there is a Tarski structure M that satisﬁes Υ but such that M |
 α∗ . The
domain D must be Dsit ∪ Dact ∪ Dobj , with Dstrt ⊆ Dsit as the set of starting situations, and with ι0 = SM0 ∈ Dstrt . SinceM |
 Υ , both Dobj and Dact are countably inﬁnite, say Dobj = {δ1, δ2, . . .}, and Dact = {λ1, λ2, . . .}. We deﬁne the map-
pings θ , π and ω by the following:
• θ maps the i-th standard name for objects to δi , and the i-th standard name for actions to λi ;
• for any z ∈ Z and ι ∈ Dstrt , we deﬁne π(z, ι) by:
π(〈 〉, ι) = ι,
π(z · n, ι) = doM(θ(n),π(z, ι));
• for any ι ∈ Dstrt , we let ω(ι) be the world w deﬁned by the following:
w
[
G(n1, . . . ,nk), z
] = 1 iff 〈θ(n1), . . . , θ(nk)
〉 ∈ GM,
w
[
F (n1, . . . ,nk), z
] = 1 iff 〈θ(n1), . . . , θ(nk),π(z, ι)
〉 ∈ FM,
w
[
g(n1, . . . ,nk), z
] = θ−1(gM(θ(n1), . . . , θ(nk)
))
,
w
[
f (n1, . . . ,nk), z
] = θ−1( f M(θ(n1), . . . , θ(nk),π(z, ι)
))
.
For any ι ∈ Dstrt , ω(ι) obviously satisﬁes the rigidity constraint. Finally, we let
• e = {ω(ι) | (ι, ι0) ∈ KM};
• w0 = ω(ι0).
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α is not valid. 
Theorem 7. Let α be any sentence of ES without standard names. Then
α is valid iff Σ ∪ Υ |
FOL α∗.
Proof. The proof is almost the same as the previous one because we can re-use the same model constructions.
Let us ﬁrst assume that α is not valid. Then there is an e, w0 such that e,w0 |
 α. Now deﬁne a Tarski structure M
exactly as in the ﬁrst part of the proof of Theorem 6. It is easy to see that Σ (as well as Υ ) is satisﬁed by M. In particular,
the construction ensures that situations have unique names and that neither S0 nor any situation K -accessible from S0
has a predecessor, that is, these are truly initial situations. Furthermore, by construction, the situations reachable from the
initial situations are the only situations of the model so that the induction axiom for situations (Axiom 2) is also satisﬁed.
The rest of the argument is exactly as in Theorem 6, from which Σ ∪ Υ |
FOL α∗ follows.
Conversely, assume that Σ ∪Υ |
FOL α∗ . Then there is a Tarski structure M that satisﬁes Σ ∪Υ but such that M |
 α∗ .
We deﬁne the mappings θ , π and ω as well as w0 and e exactly as in Theorem 6. As before, all the properties of Lemma 14
are satisﬁed and, hence, e,w0 |
 α, which proves that α is not valid. 
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